

Arguing about reputation. The LRep language

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Abstract. Since electronic and open environments became a reality, computational models of trust and reputation have attracted increasing interest in the field of multi-agent systems (MAS), the . In virtual societies of human actors very well-known mechanisms are already used to control non normative agents, for instance, the eBay scoring system. In virtual societies of artificial and autonomous agents, the same necessity arises, and several computational trust and reputation models have appeared in literature to cover this necessity. Typically, these models provide evaluations of agents' performance in a specific context, taking into account direct experiences and third party information. This last source of information is the communication of agents' own opinions. When dealing with cognitive agents endowed with complex reasoning mechanisms, we would like that these opinions could be justified in a way such that the resulting information was more complete and reliable. In this paper we present LRep, a language based on an existing ontology of reputation that allows building justifications of communicated social evaluations.

1 Introduction

The field of multiagent systems has experienced an important growth and evolution in the past few years. These systems can be seen as virtual societies composed of autonomous agents where there is a need to interact with other members of the society to achieve their goals. As in human societies, these interactions usually involve an exchange of information. The problem of partners selection via the detection of good or bad potential partners, or how agents evaluate the credibility of received information, arises in a scenario like this. Human societies, throughout history, have been using trust and reputation mechanisms for this purpose. These powerful social control artifacts have been studied from different perspectives, such as psychology (Bromley [1], Karlins et al. [2]), sociology (Buskens [3]), philosophy (Plato [4], Hume [5]) and economics (Marimon et al. [6], Celentani et al. [7]).

In multiagent systems the interest in these mechanisms has considerably increased and, as a consequence, numerous computational trust and reputation models have appeared in the literature. E-Commerce sites already use some of them (eBay [8], Amazon [9], OnSale [10]). These models consider reputation as a centralized global property. So, the reputation of each agent is public and all

agents perceive the same reputation value. More sophisticated models ([11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17]) consider reputation as a subjective property. Therefore every agent has its own reputation system that provides evaluations of other agents calculated from external communication and direct experience, giving the agent its own vision of the society. Furthermore, other models (see [18], [19]) take into account social information when providing these evaluations.

One of these models is Repage [17], a computational system based on a cognitive theory of reputation. This model is designed to be part of a cognitive agent, i.e., an agent endowed with beliefs, desires and intentions. Like other reputation models, Repage uses social evaluations obtained from direct experiences and communicated social evaluations as source for calculations. However, this communication is quite simple and very limited, allowing only the exchange of single values associated with a reliability measure. In a real environment and for an agent that is able to make complex reasoning, an opinion without being justified can be very weak and not as useful as a fully justified opinion that points out where the information is coming from. With agents using a complex reputation model like Repage, it can be as important to know the followed procedure and the sources used to calculate the final value, as the final value itself.

In this paper we present LRep, a simple language that can be used with a model like Repage to elaborate justifications of calculated values. These justifications can have different levels of detail. So, agents can decide the amount of extra information and the level of detail of them when there are communicating social evaluations.

In Section 2 we briefly introduce Repage and its theory framework. Following this, in Section 3 we introduce an ontology of reputation and its specification using description logic. This ontology will be used to define the semantics of LRep. Afterwards, in Section 4 we define the syntax and semantics of LRep. In Section 5 we present several situations where the use of LRep and justification helps to improve the performance of cognitive agents. Finally, Section 6 presents the conclusions and future work.

2 The Repage System

In order to present the Repage system it is necessary to get in touch with the theoretical framework upon which it is based. This framework is a cognitive theory of reputation developed by Conte and Paolucci in [20]. In this book they study the impact of the transmission of social evaluations in artificial societies, pointing out the important difference between information that is thought to be true and information that is said.

This theory describes a model of imAGE, REPUTation and their interplay. Although both are social evaluations, image and reputation are distinct objects. Image is a simple evaluative belief; it tells that the target is “good” or “bad” with respect to a norm, a standard, or a skill. Reputation is a belief about the existence of a communicated evaluation. Consequently, to assume that a target t is assigned a given reputation implies only to assume that t is reputed to be

“good” or “bad”, i.e., that this evaluation circulates, but it does not imply to share the evaluation.

To select good partners, agents need to form and update own social evaluations; hence, they must exchange evaluations with one another. If agents should transmit only believed image, the circulation of social knowledge would be bound to stop soon. On the other side, agents that believe all the informations that they receive would be no more autonomous; in order to preserve their autonomy, agents need to *decide* independently whether to share or not and whether to believe or not others’ evaluations of a given target. Hence, they must:

- form both evaluations (image) and meta-evaluations (reputation), keeping distinct the representation of own and others’ evaluations, before
- deciding whether or not to integrate reputation with their own image of a target.

Unlike other current systems, in Repage reputation does not coincide with image. Indeed, agents can either transmit their own image of a given target, which they hold to be true, or report on what they have “heard” about the target, i.e. its reputation, whether they believe this to be true or not. Of course, in the latter case, they will neither commit to the information truth value nor feel responsible for its consequences. Consequently, agents are expected to transmit uncertain information, and a given positive or negative reputation may circulate over a population of agents even if its content is not actually believed by the majority.

2.1 The Repage Architecture

The Repage architecture (see figure 1) was designed to reflect the distinction between image and reputation. It has three main elements: a memory, a set of detectors and the analyzer. The memory is composed of a set of inter-connected predicates that are conceptually organized in different levels of abstraction. Each predicate that belongs to one of the main types, the ones showed in figure 1, contains a probabilistic evaluation that refers to a certain target agent in a specific role. For instance, an agent may have an image of agent T (target) as a seller (role), and a different image of the same agent T as informant. The evaluation consist of a probability distribution over the discrete sorted set of labels: {Very Bad, Bad, Normal, Good, Very Good}.

The network of dependences specifies which predicates contribute to the values of others. In this sense, each predicate has a set of antecedents and a set of consequents. The detectors, inference units specialized in each particular kind of predicate, receive notifications from predicates that changes or that appear in the system and uses the dependences to recalculate the new values or to populate the memory with new predicates.

Each predicate has associated a strength that is function of its antecedents and of the intrinsic properties of each kind of predicate. As a general rule, predicates that resume or aggregate a bigger number of predicates will hold a higher strength.

At the first level of the Repage memory we find a set of predicates not evaluated yet by the system. *Contracts* are agreements on the future interaction between two agents. Their result is represented by a *Fulfillment*. *Communications* is information that other agents may convey, and may be related to three different aspects: the image that the informant has about a target, the image that, according to the informant, a third party agent has on the target, and the reputation that the informant has about the target.

In level two we have two kind of predicates. *Valued communication* is the subjective evaluation of the communication received that takes into account, for instance, the image the agent may have of the informant as informant. Communications from agents whose credibility is low will not be considered as strong as the ones coming from well reputed informants. An *outcome* is the agent's subjective evaluation of a direct interaction, built up from a fulfillment and a contract.

At the third level we find two predicates that are only fed by valued communications. On the one hand, a *shared voice* will hold the information received about the same target and same role coming from communicated reputations. On the other hand, *shared evaluation* is the equivalent for communicated images and third party images.

Shared voice predicates will finally generate *candidate reputation*; shared evaluation together with outcomes will generate *candidate image*. Newly generated candidate reputation and image aren't usually strong enough; new communications and new direct interactions will contribute to reinforce them until a threshold, over which they become full-fledged image or reputation. We refer to [17] for a much more detailed presentation.

From the point of view of the agent structure, integration with the other parts of our deliberative agents is straightforward. Repage memory links to the main memory of the agent that is fed by its communication and decision making module, and at the same time, this last module, the one that contain all the reasoning procedures uses the predicates generated by Repage to make decisions.

3 The Ontological Dimension of Reputation

As we have shown so far, reputation mechanisms play a crucial role in the way we conceive agents' societies. But social evaluations are more than simple ratio scores. In cognitive agents the fact of acknowledging certain reputation or image of other agents imply a mental state, a set of beliefs about the future performance of target agents, but at the same time, the formation of such a high level predicates, require several intermediate cognitive steps, that generate a full taxonomy of interrelated predicates. From this point of view, it is easy to think about an ontology of reputation and image showing this structure. A possible ontology is defined in [21].

The concepts that appear in this ontology are very similar to the typology of predicates that Repage defines. In [21] we define a mapping between Repage predicates and the ontology (that is almost direct). Still though, we want to




Fig. 1. The Repage architecture

use as source of information this common ontology, since is not linked to any particular reputation model. A graphical representation of it is shown in Figure 2 and 3. Nevertheless, we need a more formal approach. Because LRep language is based on this ontology we need a formalism that allows us to refer instances of its concepts. For that, we decided to use description logic(DL). As we will explain, DL offers an elegant way to represent application domains, and its concepts have been used for the semantic web (in term of the language OWL DL) to describe ontologies. Furthermore, its syntax and semantics is very well known and accurately define(see [22]). In this section we first make a short introduction to what is a description logic system and why it is a good option to use as an ontology formalism. Afterwards, we give a description of the ontology using this formalism.

3.1 Description Logic

Description Logic (DL) is a knowledge representation formalism used to represent the application domain, the world. Its power relies on the formal logic-based semantics and the reasoning engine with which it is equipped. A DL system has two differentiate submodules, *TBox* and *ABox*.

On the one hand, the *TBox* contains a set of expressions in one of the languages of the \mathcal{AL} -languages family (see [22]), that define the terminology of

the domain (the classes). This family of languages can be seen as fragments of first-order Logic(FOL) [22]¹, but its expressiveness simplifies the formulas and is specially suited for the definition of concepts. On the other hand, the *ABox* contains assertions about named individuals in terms of the terminology defined in the *TBox*, the state of the world. In general, a knowledge representation system based on DL provides facilities to set and update knowledge bases, to manipulate it and to reason over it.

Because DL systems has a semantics that identifies its description language as segments of FOL, the set of predicates contain implicit knowledge, that can be made explicit using inference. Thus, the concept of satisfiability is defined in the classical way (see [22]). Having a DL system D , a concept C and an element a , we say that $D \models C(a)$ iff $C(a)$ can be inferred from D , that is, if it is deducible using some of the complete reason algorithms defined for DL systems (Structural Subsumption Algorithm or Tableau Algorithm, for instance)[22].

Nowadays, the interest in DL systems has considerably increased due to the popularity of ontologies for the semantic web and specifically, because of the OWL language. The semantic web uses as standard the *OWL* language to structure knowledge contained in web sites, so, to describe ontologies. This language(OWL) has three variants, one of them is *OWL DL*, a language that uses the concepts of description logic we have explained in this section.




Fig. 2. The taxonomy, membership relations and components of evaluative beliefs

3.2 A DL Version of the Ontology

The ontology showed in Figures 2 and 3 defines a taxonomy of evaluative beliefs, that represents beliefs that have some social evaluations. We divided them into

¹ So, all formulas of \mathcal{AL} -languages can be expressed as FOL formulas keeping the same semantic

SimpleBelief and *MetaBelief*. This division is conceptually important when talking about cognitive agents. An agent holding a simple belief acknowledges the evaluation that the belief contains, meanwhile it is not necessary in a Metabelief, since it is a belief about other agents mind, an interpretation of what other agents think. Therefore, an agent holding a Metabelief do not need to believe the nested evaluation. For instance, I can believe that my friend thinks that his car is nice, but I don't necessary agree with this opinion. Then, we consider an Image, Direct Experiences and a SharedVoice as simple beliefs, and Reputation and Shared Images as Metabeliefs (see [21] for the details of this decision). The meaning of these objects is the same we described in Repage. A direct experience should be understood as an outcome predicate in Repage.

These concepts are located in the bottom part of the taxonomy. A system using this ontology will have instances of these concepts. All them have, at least, one attribute that is an object *Evaluation* containing information about the evaluation itself. Part of this information is the value of the evaluation, the representation of goodness and badness. In literature there are several possible representations, from simple boolean with bad/good, to probability distributions over some sorted set, like in the case of Repage. In [21] the authors describe four representation types, including transformation operations between them. For the sake of simplicity, in this first approach we will use a simple sorted labeled set, *VB, B, N, G, VG* meaning, *Very Bad, Bad, Neutral, Good* and *Very Good*.

At this point we have all the elements to understand a description of the ontology, that corresponds with the *TBox* of a DL system²:

$$\begin{aligned}
Entity &\equiv SingleAgent \sqcup Group \sqcup Institution \\
Focus &\equiv Skill \sqcup Standard \sqcup Norm \\
Evaluation &\equiv \leq 1hasSource.Entity \sqcap = 1hasTarget.Entity \sqcap \\
&\equiv \sqcap = 1hasContext.Focus \leq 1hasStrength.R \sqcap \\
&\equiv \sqcap \leq 1hasValue.Value \\
Voice &\equiv \leq 1hasGossiper.Entity \sqcap \leq 1hasRecipient.Entity \sqcap \\
&\equiv = 1hasEval.Evaluation \\
Image &\equiv SimpleBelief \sqcap = 1hasEval.Evaluation \\
DExperience &\equiv SimpleBelief \sqcap = 1hasEval.Evaluation \sqcap = 1hasTrans.R \\
ShVoice &\equiv SimpleBelief \sqcap = 1hasVoice.Voice \sqcap \exists hasGossiper.Entity \\
ShImage &\equiv MetaBelief \sqcap = 1hasEval.Evaluation \sqcap \exists hasSource.Entity \\
Reputation &\equiv MetaBelief \sqcap = 1hasVoice.Voice
\end{aligned}$$

In this case we consider as primitive concepts *SingleAgent*, *Group*, *Institution*, *Skill*, *Standard* and *Norm*. The concept *Value* is used to define the predicates *Value(VB)*, *Value(B)*, *Value(N)*, *Value(G)* and *Value(VG)*, as axioms of the system. All other concepts are defined using the \mathcal{ALUN} -language (see [22]).

² The semantics of $(\leq nR)$ and $(= nR)$ is defined as $(\leq nR)^I = \{a \in \Delta^I \text{ where } |\{b | (a, b) \in R^I\}| \leq n\}$ and $(= nR)^I = \{a \in \Delta^I \text{ where } |\{b | (a, b) \in R^I\}| = n\}$, where I is an interpretation, Δ^I the domain of the interpretation, and R^I the interpretation of the relation R




Fig. 3. The main classes and components of a social evaluation and voice

4 The LRep: A Language for Reputation and Image Justification

In this section we define both the syntax and semantics of the LRep language. The objective of this language is to provide a mechanism to represent not only the evaluation of an image or reputation but also a justification of that value. This justification should increase the richness of the exchanged information about image and reputation and therefore, increase the effectiveness of spreading them. That justification can be sometimes even more relevant than the evaluation itself (see section 5).

First, we will define the syntax of the language giving an informal semantics. Finally, we will give a formal semantics of the language.

4.1 Defining the Basis of LRep

Let $A = \{a_1, \dots, a_n\}$, $R = \{r_1, \dots, r_m\}$ and $V = \{VB, B, N, G, VG\}$ be a set of agents, a set of roles, and a sorted set of evaluation labels respectively. We define the set *Eval* of all possible evaluations and evaluation as follows:

$$Eval = \{ \langle a, r, v \rangle \mid a \in A, r \in R, v \in V \} \quad (1)$$

We define a set of predicate letters P , and a set of quantifier letters N

$$P = \{I, R, ShI, ShV, DE, CI, CI_1, \dots, CI_n, CR, CR_1, \dots, CR_n\} \quad (2)$$

$$N = \{N_1, \dots, N_n\} \quad (3)$$

Intuitively, the letters I, R, ShI and ShV refer to evaluations that are *Image, Reputation, Shared Image* and *Shared Voice*. The predicates CI , and CR refer to *Communicated Image* and *Communicated Reputation*. Concretely, CI_i and CR_i refer to a *Communicated Image* and *Communicated Reputation* from an agent $a_i \in A$. DE refers to a *Direct Experience*. Notice that in the ontology, this predicate has an object evaluation and a real value. This second one refers to an identification number of the transaction that produced the direct experience.

4.2 Simple Predicate Formula (SPF) and Extended Predicate Formula (EPF)

Formulas in the LRep language are divided in SPF and EPF.

Let $e \in Eval$, $t \in \mathbb{R}$ and $1 \leq i \leq n$, then the following formulas are SPF:

- $I(e), R(e), ShI(e), ShV(e)$
- $DE(e, t), CI_i(e), CR_i(e)$

Let $1 \leq i \leq n$ and $e \in Eval$ then

- \emptyset (empty formula) is an EPF
- If α is *SPF* then α is *EPF*
- If α is *SPF* then $N_i\alpha$ is *EPF*
- The formulas $N_iDE(e)$, $N_iCI(e)$ and $N_iCR(e)$ are *EPF*
- Inductively, if β and γ are *EPF*, then $\beta; \gamma$ is *EPF*

Intuitively, N_iX means that the agent has received at least i communicated images or communicated reputations, or that the agent has had at least i direct experiences³. The formal semantics of the quantifier is defined in Section 4.4. Also, we say that all formulas that are *SPF* as well as the formulas $N_iDE(e)$, $N_iCI(e)$ and $N_iCR(e)$ are atomic formulas.

4.3 Justification

We define a justification in terms of LRep language as follows. Let α be a *SPF* and γ be an *EPF*, then a LRep formula is defined as:

$$\{\alpha : \gamma\} \tag{4}$$

The idea is that in the expression $\{\alpha : \gamma\}$, the α predicate is the main element to communicate, and it is *justified* by the formula γ , that in fact it is a list of less generic predicates. For example we can have justifications like this:

³ We decide N_i to be a lower bound instead of an exact number because this second case is too restrictive and leads to only an honest-liars communication, forgetting the interesting option of telling a truth information but not exact. We have in mind to include in the future negative connective that will allow setting upper and lower bounds

$$\{I(< a_1, r_1, VB >) : N_5CI(< a_1, r_1, B >); N_3DE(< a_1, r_1, VB >); CI_{a_3}(< a_1, r_1, VB >)\}$$

The above expression means that the Image of a_1 towards the role r_1 is very bad *because* we have received more than 5 communicated images saying that a_1 in r_1 is bad, we have experienced more that 3 times that the agent is very bad, and because a_3 communicated us that a_1 in the role r_1 is very bad. Of course, we are not talking about neither the truth of the explanation, nor the truth of the communication itself. Agents can lie, and of course can give partial information.

The syntax of LRep language can be defined using the following grammar.

$$\begin{aligned} LRep &::= \{SPF : EPF\} \\ SPF &::= I(E)|R(E)|ShI(E)|ShV(E)|DE(E, IN)|Comm \\ Comm &::= CI_{agent}(E)|CR_{agent}(E) \\ E &::= < Target, Context, Value > \\ EPF &::= \emptyset|N_{IN}CI(E)|N_{IN}CR(E)|N_{IN}DE(E)|SPF|EPF; EPF \\ Context &::= norm|standard|skill \\ Target &::= agent|group|institution \\ Value &::= VB|B|N|G|VG \end{aligned}$$

4.4 Semantic of LRep

To define the formal semantics of the language we have to introduce the concept of *correctness* within a LRep expression. Saying that I had more than 10 direct experiences with a seller when I really had 2 is not correct taking into account my state of the world (where I only had 2 direct experiences). So, the semantics of LRep will be determined for the correctness of the expression towards certain state of the world. Of course, this model of the world will be represented as an instance of a DL system with the *TBox* defined in Section 3.2.

So, let $F = < T, A >$ be a DL system describing the state of the world of an agent, where T is the TBox of terminological terms composed of the concepts defined in Section 3.2, and A the ABox with the assertions describing the state of the world at certain moment of time. We say that a justification $J = \{\alpha : \gamma\}$ is correct towards the system F , written as $F \supset J$ iff each of the components of J is correct towards F . More formally:

$$F \supset \{\alpha : \gamma\} \leftrightarrow F \supset \alpha \text{ and } F \supset \gamma$$

Then, the correctness of formulas SPF and EPF is defined in terms of the correctness of its atomic formulas. For instance, considering the atomic formula $DE(< y, r, v >, t)$ its correctness is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} F \supset DE(< y, r, v >, t) &\leftrightarrow \exists a, e \text{ such that} \\ &F \models DExperience(a), hasEval(a, e), \\ &hasTrans(a, t) \text{ and } evalFine(e, y, r, v, F) \end{aligned}$$

where we define the predicate *evalFine* as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} evalFine(e, y, r, v, F) = True \leftrightarrow & F \models hasTarget(e, y) \text{ and} \\ & F \models hasContext(e, r) \text{ and} \\ & F \models hasValue(e, v) \text{ and} \\ & F \models Value(v), Focus(r), Entity(y) \end{aligned}$$

Following the same idea, the correctness of all atomic elements of LRep is defined in the next table:

$$\begin{aligned} F \supset I(< y, r, v >) \leftrightarrow \exists a, e \text{ such that} \\ & F \models Image(a), hasEval(a, e), \\ & \text{and } evalFine(e, y, r, v, F) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} F \supset CI_x(< y, r, v >) \leftrightarrow \exists a, e \text{ such that} \\ & F \models ShImage(a), hasSource(a, x), hasEval(a, e) \\ & \text{and } evalFine(e, y, r, v, F) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} F \supset CR_x(< y, r, v >) \leftrightarrow \exists a, v, e \text{ such that} \\ & F \models ShVoice(a), hasGossiper(a, x) \\ & hasVoice(a, v), hasEval(v, e) \\ & \text{and } evalFine(e, y, r, v, F) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} F \supset R(< y, r, v >) \leftrightarrow \exists a, v, e \text{ such that} \\ & F \models Reputation(a), hasVoice(a, v) \\ & hasEval(v, e) \text{ and } evalFine(e, y, r, v, F) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} F \supset N_i DE(< y, r, v >) \leftrightarrow |A| \geq i \text{ where } A = \{ DExperience(a) | \exists e, t \\ \text{such that } F \models hasEval(a, e), hasTrans(a, t) \\ \text{and } evalFine(e, y, r, v, F) \} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} F \supset N_i CI(< y, r, v >) \leftrightarrow |A| \geq i \text{ where } A = \{ Entity(x) | \exists a, e \\ \text{such that } F \models ShImage(a), hasSource(a, x) \\ hasEval(a, e) \text{ and } evalFine(e, y, r, v, F) \} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} F \supset N_i CR(< y, r, v >) \leftrightarrow |A| \geq i \text{ where } A = \{ Entity(x) | \exists a, e \\ \text{such that } F \models ShVoice(a), hasGossiper(a, x) \\ hasVoice(a, v), hasEval(v, e) \\ \text{and } evalFine(e, y, r, v, F) \} \end{aligned}$$

Finally, let γ be an *EPF* formula, if $\gamma \equiv \emptyset$ then $F \supset \gamma$. If $\gamma \equiv \beta_1; \beta_2$ then, $F \supset \gamma \leftrightarrow F \supset \beta_1$ and $F \supset \beta_2$.

5 Using LRep

In this section we apply LRep in a concrete scenario. Let A be the set of agent names $A = \{John, Debra, Laura, \dots\}$ and R a set of roles $R = \{seller,$

informant, buyer}. In this environment, everybody can play the three roles. In a typical transaction, an agent acting as a *buyer*, buys a specific product from another agent that acts as a *seller*. Also, there is the possibility to exchange information about other agents' performance, acting then as an *informant*. Agents are cognitive and use the Repage model to deal with social evaluations. In this case they evaluate agents as *sellers* (whether they sell the products with the maximum quality, as they claim) and as *informants* (since they may not provide accurate information or even they may lie). Currently the exchange of social evaluations is done in terms of Image or Reputation. As shown in Section 2 there is an implicit commitment sending an Image (since it is the agent's own opinion) that does not exist when sending Reputation.

After introducing the scenario, we expose several cases where by using a justification, ambiguous situations become clearer and communications richer.

5.1 Case 1: Discrimination between Weak and Strong Predicates

One of the main issues when exchanging social evaluations is the inherent subjectivity that they are associated with. Check for instance, the following communications:

$$\begin{aligned} C1: & \{I(\langle John, seller, VG \rangle)\} \\ C2: & \{I(\langle John, seller, VG \rangle) : N_2DE(\langle John, seller, VG \rangle)\} \\ C3: & \{I(\langle John, seller, VG \rangle) : N_{20}DE(\langle John, seller, VG \rangle)\} \end{aligned}$$

The first communication, *C1*, indicates that the image the informant has of *John* as a *seller* is *VG* (very good). However, it does not tell us anything about the strength of it. Communications *C2* and *C3* show us some more details. Assuming that agents send correct information towards its vision of the world (in the sense we define in Section 4.4), we should agree that the justification in *C3* gives more reasons to believe the communicated image than *C2*. And in this sense, communicated image in *C3* is *stronger* than the one in *C2* and of course than the one in *C1*. In terms of reputation we can have similar situations.

$$\begin{aligned} C1: & \{R(\langle John, seller, VG \rangle)\} \\ C2: & \{R(\langle John, seller, VG \rangle) : N_2CR(\langle John, seller, VG \rangle)\} \\ C3: & \{R(\langle John, seller, VG \rangle) : N_{20}CR(\langle John, seller, VG \rangle)\} \end{aligned}$$

5.2 Case 2: Avoiding Unreliable Information

Another case where the use of LRep helps in a better understanding of the messages, is in the detection of information that should not be taken into account because the justification contradicts the state of the world that the recipient has. For instance, check the following justification:

$$\{I(\langle John, seller, B \rangle) : CI_{Laura}(\langle John, seller, B \rangle); \\ CI_{Debra}(\langle John, seller, VB \rangle); \\ I(\langle Laura, informant, VG \rangle); \\ I(\langle Debra, informant, VG \rangle)\}$$

In this case, the informant justifies its image of *John* as a seller pointing out that he has received two communicated images, one from *Laura* and another from *Debra* (that are considered very good informants), saying that *John* is mostly bad. However, if the recipient of the message has an image of *Laura* and *Debra* as informants that is very bad the image of *John* cannot be considered, at least without further knowledge that could solve the contradiction.

5.3 Case 3: Control of Granularity

One interesting property that LRep has is the granularity of its predicates. In this sense, even in this first version it is already possible to give more and more detailed information to properly justify a communication. For instance, let's consider the following communication:

$$\{R(\langle Laura, seller, VG \rangle) : ShV(\langle Laura, seller, G \rangle); \\ ShV(\langle Laura, seller, VG \rangle)\}$$

Here, this agent is justifying a reputation by means of two shared voices that at the same time are justified as follows:

$$\{ShV(\langle Laura, seller, G \rangle) : N_1CR(\langle Laura, seller, G \rangle)\} \\ \{ShV(\langle Laura, seller, VG \rangle) : N_2CR(\langle Laura, seller, VG \rangle)\}$$

Another possible and more detailed justification of the two shared voices could be:

$$\{ShV(\langle Laura, seller, G \rangle) : CR_{Debra}(\langle Laura, seller, G \rangle)\} \\ \{ShV(\langle Laura, seller, VG \rangle) : CR_{John}(\langle Laura, seller, VG \rangle); \\ CR_{John}(\langle Jorge, seller, VG \rangle)\}$$

Therefore, this justification could have included some information about the images of the informants, that supposedly are good. And these images, can be justified with the detail that the agent considers appropriate. The point of this discussion is to make the reader notice that using LRep, agents can reach the level of detail they want in the justifications.

5.4 Case 4: Putting Everything Together: Dialogs

Finally, extending LRep by allowing questions we can establish dialogs between two agents. In the following example we have agents A_1 and A_2 exchanging information. Initially, A_1 sends an image without any justification.

$$A_1 \rightarrow A_2 : \{I(\langle \text{Laura}, \text{informant}, \text{VG} \rangle)\}$$

At this point, A_2 does not know A_1 very well, then it asks for more information:

$$\begin{aligned} A_2 \rightarrow A_1 &: \{I(\langle \text{Laura}, \text{informant}, \text{VG} \rangle?)\} \\ A_1 \rightarrow A_2 &: \{I(\langle \text{Laura}, \text{informant}, \text{VG} \rangle) : \\ &\quad CI_{\text{Laura}}(\langle \text{Debra}, \text{seller}, \text{VB} \rangle); I(\langle \text{Debra}, \text{seller}, \text{VB} \rangle) \\ &\quad CI_{\text{Laura}}(\langle \text{John}, \text{seller}, \text{VG} \rangle); I(\langle \text{John}, \text{seller}, \text{VG} \rangle)\} \end{aligned}$$

Again A_2 is not satisfied. It wants to know how the images about *Debra* and *John* where formed, so, it asks for it:

$$\begin{aligned} A_2 \rightarrow A_1 &: \{I(\langle \text{Debra}, \text{seller}, \text{VB} \rangle?)\} \\ A_2 \rightarrow A_1 &: \{I(\langle \text{John}, \text{seller}, \text{VG} \rangle?)\} \\ A_1 \rightarrow A_2 &: \{I(\langle \text{Debra}, \text{seller}, \text{VB} \rangle) : N_3DE(\langle \text{Debra}, \text{seller}, \text{VB} \rangle)\} \\ A_1 \rightarrow A_2 &: \{I(\langle \text{John}, \text{seller}, \text{VG} \rangle) : N_2DE(\langle \text{John}, \text{seller}, \text{VG} \rangle)\} \end{aligned}$$

Now, A_2 knows that the original information about *Laura* as *informant* is very good for A_1 because is based on that once, *Laura* gave information about *Debra* and *John* as very good and very bad sellers respectively, and that A_2 experienced with both of them observing that they behaved in the same way that *Laura* said.

Knowing this, the conclusions that A_2 may get depend on its own state of the world, its beliefs:

- **Ignore the information:** It may have already had some direct experiences with *Debra* and *John* and they behaved the opposite of what A_1 claims. In this case, the information that *Laura* as *informant* is very good is not reliable for A_2 .
- **Take the information as reliable:** In this case, the evaluations of the direct experiences that A_2 and A_1 had with *Debra* and *John* may coincide, and then, A_2 may consider the original information reliable.
- **Need for more information:** Another case may come out when for instance, A_2 does not have any information about *John* or *Debra*. In this case, if for A_2 the original information is important enough and have the chance to do it, it may interact with both to acquire first hand experiences, or may be it may ask to another agent (with good image as informant) to contrast the information. The idea is that in justifications, every piece of information can be contrasted, either by direct experiences or by communications. So, in this example, the number of possible actions is quite high.

6 Conclusions and Future Work

As we stated from the beginning, we are dealing with cognitive agents. In our case it means agents that have beliefs, desires, intentions and goals to accomplish and that are able to reason about them. This is the context where a language like LRep has sense. By exchanging not only simple image/reputation values but justifications of these values, we are opening the possibility to reason about the process the informant followed to build those values and not only about the values themselves. Talking about image and reputation, and as we have shown with some examples in section 5, that extra information can be as useful as the value itself.

An important aspect of LRep is that the informant can decide how deep the justification has to be. Agents can choose from a wide range of possibilities when: From no justification at all to the exact details of the calculation. Furthermore, the fact of using a common ontology of reputation for the LRep semantics, allows to apply LRep in other reputation models.

Future experiments are planned to be done using RePage and LRep. In a scenario like the one described in [23], we have a set of buyers and sellers. Sellers sell items with certain quality (from a predefined minimum and maximum), and buyers want to buy always the maximum quality. Providing the agents with RePage system, in [23] several experiments were run to observe the performance of the buyers per turn, varying several parameters (like number of sellers or buyers) and dealing with cheaters. The incorporation of the LRep language in these simulations will require two parallel phases. On the one hand, design more sophisticated decision making processes to take advantage of this new functionality, and on the other hand, study the impact, the creation and motivation of sending false information in justifications.

Besides this, the LRep language is very simple, almost every atomic element in LRep coincides with an element of the ontology. Only the quantifiers define more sophisticated semantics. Extensions of LRep are expected, for instance, including universal or existential quantifiers. Also, more sophisticated protocols of communication should be taken into account.

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