Manipulating Boolean Games Through Communication
Michael Wooldridge, Sarit Kraus, Inon Zuckerman and John Grant
We address the issue of manipulating games through communication. In the specific setting we consider (a variation of Boolean games), we assume there is some set of environment variables, the value of which is not directly accessible to players; each player has their own beliefs about these variables, and makes decisions about what actions to perform based on these beliefs. The communication we consider takes the form of (truthful) announcements about the value of some environment variables; the effect of an announcement about some variable is to modify the beliefs of the players who hear the announcement so that they accurately reflect the value of the variable. By choosing announcements appropriately, it is possible to perturb the rational outcomes of the game away from certain outcomes and towards others. We specifically focus on the issue of \emph{stabilisation}: making announcements that transform a system from having no stable states to one that has stable configurations.