A Mechanism for Dynamic Ride Sharing based on Parallel Auctions
Alexander Kleiner, Bernhard Nebel and Vittorio Amos Ziparo
Car pollution is one of the major causes of greenhouse emissions, and traffic congestion is rapidly becoming a social plague. Dynamic Ride Sharing (DRS) systems have the potential to mitigate this problem by online computing plans for car drivers, e.g. commuters, allowing them for sharing their rides. Existing efforts in DRS are suffering from the problem that participants are abandoning the system after repeatedly failing in getting a shared ride. In this paper we present a DRS solution based on parallel auctions with incentive compatibility of bids. While existing DRS systems are mainly focusing on fixed assignments that minimize the totally travelled distance, the presented approach is adaptive to individual preferences of the participants. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to present a DRS approach based on parallel auctions.