Accepted Papers
Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems
A dynamic logic of normative systems
Andreas Herzig, Emiliano Lorini, Frédéric Moisan and Nicolas Troquard
A general elicitation-free protocol for allocating indivisible goods
Sylvain Bouveret and Jérôme Lang
A Market Clearing Solution for Social Lending
Ning Chen and Arpita Ghosh
A Maximum Likelihood Approach towards Aggregating Partial Orders
Lirong Xia and Vincent Conitzer
A Mechanism for Dynamic Ride Sharing based on Parallel Auctions
Alexander Kleiner, Bernhard Nebel and Vittorio Amos Ziparo
Accelerating Best Response Calculation in Large Extensive Games
Michael Johanson, Kevin Waugh, Michael Bowling and Martin Zinkevich
Action Selection via Learning Behavior Patterns in Multi-Robot Systems
Can Erdogan and Manuela Veloso
Agents, Actions and Goals in Dynamic Environments
Peter Novak and Wojtek Jamroga
Aggregating Dependency Graphs into Voting Agendas in Multi-Issue Elections
Stéphane Airiau, Ulle Endriss, Umberto Grandi, Daniele Porello and Joel Uckelman
Alternating Epistemic Mu-Calculus
Nils Bulling and Wojtek Jamroga
An agent architecture for prognostic reasoning assistance
Jean Oh, Felipe Meneguzzi, Katia Sycara and Timothy Norman
An Efficient Monte-Carlo Algorithm for Pricing Combinatorial Prediction Markets for Tournaments
David Pennock and Lirong Xia
An Empirical Study of Seeding Manipulations and Their Prevention
Tyrel Russell and Peter van Beek
An Interaction-Oriented Model for Multi-Scale Simulation
Philippe Mathieu and Sebastien Picault
Approximately Strategy-Proof Voting
Eleanor Birrell and Rafael Pass
Approximating optimal combinatorial auctions for complements using restricted welfare maximization
Pingzhong Tang and Tuomas Sandholm
Assumption-based Argumentation Dialogues
Xiuyi Fan and Francesca Toni
AstonCAT-Plus: An Efficient Specialist for the TAC Market Design Tournament
Meng Chang and Minghua He
Attack Semantics for Abstract Argumentation
Guido Boella, Leon van der Torre and Serena Villata
Binary Aggregation with Integrity Constraints
Umberto Grandi and Ulle Endriss
Budgeted Social Choice: From Consensus to Personalized Decision Making
Tyler Lu and Craig Boutilier
Changing One's Mind: Erase or Rewind?
Celia da Costa Pereira, Andrea G. B. Tettamanzi and Serena Villata
Choosing collectively optimal sets of alternatives based on the Condorcet criterion
Edith Elkind, Jérôme Lang and Abdallah Saffidine
Coalitional Voting Manipulation: A Game-Theoretic Perspective
Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind and Piotr Faliszewski
Comparing Variants of Strategic Ability
Wojtek Jamroga and Nils Bulling
Concise Characteristic Function Representations in Coalitional Games Based on Agent Types
Suguru Ueda, Makoto Kitaki, Atsushi Iwasaki and Makoto Yokoo
Considerate Equilibrium
Martin Hoefer, Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Alexander Skopalik and Berthold Vöcking
Continuous Time Planning for Multiagent Teams with Temporal Constraints
Zhengyu Yin, Milind Tambe and Kanna Rajan
Coordinating Logistics Operations with Privacy Guarantees
Thomas Léauté and Boi Faltings
Dynamic Sanctioning for Robust and Cost-Efficient Norm Compliance
Daniel Villatoro, Giulia Andrighetto and Jordi Sabater-Mir
Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games
John Augustine, Ning Chen, Edith Elkind, Angelo Fanelli, Nikolay Gravin and Dmitry Shiryaev
Efficient Mechanisms with Risky Participation
Ruggiero Cavallo
Efficient planning for factored infinite-horizon DEC-POMDPs
Joni Pajarinen and Jaakko Peltonen
Embedding System Dynamics in Agent Based Models for Complex Adaptive Systems
Kiyan Ahmadizadeh, Maarika Teose, Eoin O’Mahony and Carla Gomes
Emergence and Stability of Social Conventions in Conflict Situations
Toshiharu Sugawara
Evaluation of the “Adaptive-Aggressive” Trading-Agent Strategy Against Human Traders in CDA: AA Wins
Dave Cliff and Marco De Luca
Facing Openness with Socio Cognitive Trust and Categories
Matteo Venanzi, Michele Piunti, Rino Falcone, Cristiano Castelfranchi
Generalized Reaction Functions for Solving Complex-Task Allocation Problems
Xiaoming Zheng and Sven Koenig
Generalizing Envy-Freeness Toward Group of Agents
Taiki Todo, Runcong Li, Xuemei Hu, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki and Makoto Yokoo
Group-Strategyproof Irresolute Social Choice Functions
Felix Brandt
Hustling in Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Imperfect Execution
Christopher Archibald and Yoav Shoham
Hypercubewise Preference Aggregation in Multi-issue Domains
Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang and Lirong Xia
Improving Resource Allocation Strategy Against Human Adversaries in Security Games
Rong Yang, Milind Tambe, Christopher Kiekintveld, Fernando Ordonez and Richard John
Integrating Learning into a BDI Agent for Environments with Changing Dynamics
Dhirendra Singh, Sebastian Sardina, Lin Padgham and Geoff James
Learning where you are going and from whence you came: g- and h-cost learning in real-time heuristic search
Nathan Sturtevant and Vadim Bulitko
Manipulating Boolean Games Through Communication
Michael Wooldridge, Sarit Kraus, Inon Zuckerman and John Grant
Manipulation in group argument evaluation
Martin Caminada, Gabriella Pigozzi and Mikolaj Podlaszewski
Mechanism Design for Double Auctions with Temporal Constraints
Dengji Zhao, Dongmo Zhang and Laurent Perrussel
Minimum Search To Establish Worst-Case Guarantees in Coalition Structure Generation
Talal Rahwan, Tomasz Michalak and Nicholas R. Jennings
Model Checking Knowledge in Pursuit-Evasion Games
Xiaowei Huang and Ron van der Meyden
Modeling the Emergence and Convergence of Norms
Logan Brooks, Wayne Iba and Sandip Sen
Multi-agent Plan Recognition with Partial Team Traces and Plan Libraries
Hankz Hankui Zhuo
Multi-agent soft constraint aggregation via sequential voting
Giorgio Dalla Pozza, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi and Brent Venable
On Combining Decisions from Multiple Expert Imitators for Performance
Jonathan Rubin and Ian Watson
On The Complexity of the Core over Coalition Structures
Gianluigi Greco, Enrico Malizia, Luigi Palopoli and Francesco Scarcello
On the Complexity of Voting Manipulation under Randomized Tie-Breaking
Svetlana Obraztsova and Edith Elkind
On the Fixed-Parameter Tractability of Composition-Consistent Tournament Solutions
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill and Hans Georg Seedig
Online Planning for Ad Hoc Autonomous Agent Teams
Feng Wu, Shlomo Zilberstein and Xiaoping Chen
Optimal Partitions in Additively Separable Hedonic Games
Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt and Hans Georg Seedig
Push and Swap: Fast Cooperative Path-Finding with Completeness Guarantees
Ryan Luna and Kostas Bekris
Rational decision making in a multiple-adversary environment
Anat Hashavit and Shaul Markovitch
Reasoning about Preferences in Intelligent Agents
John Thangarajah, James Harland and Simeon Visser
Rigging Tournament Brackets for Weaker Players
Isabelle Stanton and Virginia Vassilevska Williams
Robust Approximation and Incremental Elicitation in Voting Protocols
Tyler Lu and Craig Boutilier
Security Games with Multiple Attacker Resources
Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer and Ronald Parr
Simulating the Emergence of Grammatical Agreement in Multi-agent Language Games
Katrien Beuls and Sebastian Höfer
Social Distance Games
Simina Branzei and Kate Larson
Social Instruments for Robust Convention Emergence
Daniel Villatoro, Jordi Sabater-Mir and Sandip Sen
Subsidies, Stability, and Restricted Cooperation in Coalitional Games
Reshef Meir, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein and Enrico Malizia
The Complexity of Safe Manipulation under Scoring Rules
Egor Ianovski, Lan Yu, Edith Elkind and Mark Wilson
The Shapley Value as a Function of the Quota in Weighted Voting Games
Yair Zick, Alexander Skopalik and Edith Elkind
Towards More Expressive Cake Cutting
Ioannis Caragiannis, John Lai and Ariel Procaccia
Trust Decision-Making in Multi-agent Systems
Chris Burnett, Timothy Norman and Katia Sycara
Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation Under the Borda Rule is NP-Hard
Nadja Betzler, Rolf Niedermeier and Gerhard Woeginger
Using Emotions to Enhance Decision-Making
Dimitrios Antos and Avi Pfeffer
Using experience to generate new regulations
Javier Morales, Maite Lopez Sanchez and Marc Esteva
Using Gaussian Processes to Optimise Concession in Complex Negotiations against Unknown Opponents
Colin R. Williams, Valentin Robu, Enrico Gerding and Nicholas R. Jennings
Using Incentive Mechanisms for an Adaptive Regulation of Open Multi-Agent Systems
Roberto Centeno and Holger Billhardt
Verification and Implementation of Normative Behaviours in Multi-Agent Systems
Nils Bulling and Mehdi Dastani